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Every human group has a system of some kind already in place for addressing the prevailing challenges 
and opportunities.  
World Development Report 2015 
 
 
I. Introduction: Looking into the ‘Black Box’ 
In the development literature, fragility is broadly associated with evidence of a 
structurally increased risk of events with extreme consequences such as conflict, 
violence, societal upheaval, and human tragedy caused by the absence of state’s basic 
functions. Originally referred to low-income countries with very weak state capacity, the 
notion of “fragility” has progressively expanded to cover a wide range of situations - 
higher capacity middle-income countries, sub-regions and regions -  and to include 
fundamental intertwined dimensions such as societal fragility and socio-economic 
drivers. The rather diverse set of definitions and the multiplication of measurement 
dimensions have raised the question of the ‘fuzziness’ of the notion of fragility. Fragility 
is at risk of seeming like a “black box” of tautological non-explanation.  
A recent review by the Independent Evaluation Group, calls for a review of 
mechanisms to identify fragility to support increased development effectiveness in 
addressing fragility and conflict (IEG 2013). The review recognizes the increasing 
divergence between the CPIA-based definition and specific contexts of fragility, and the 
important limitations of a dominant response that mostly emphasize state-building. 
How can fragility be conceptualized and operationalized in a way that is useful to 
policymakers and practitioners when designing development strategies, and allocating 
funds? Woolcock (2014) calls for a shift away from the question of ‘whether a state is 
fragile (categorically)’ and points to the need to increase understanding of the ways 
fragility is changing over time.  
We suggest that distinguishing between status representation (‘defining fragile 
situations’) and understanding of dynamic properties (‘understanding dynamics in fragile 
situations’) could be a useful framework for facilitating this thinking. While 
acknowledging the importance of the literature on the former, this note develops the latter 
and suggests a few elements for a basic conceptual model of fragility1.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A similar approach is laid out by Longstaff et al (2010) on building resilient communities. The 
authors attempts to move beyond debating definitions of resilience (a concept also perceived by 
some as “fuzzy”) and suggest a preliminary conceptual framework for assessing community 
resilience.	  
 II. Complexity, Multi-Dimensionality, and Multiscalarity of Fragility in Local 
Contexts 
While the literature presents different approaches to describing and measuring 
fragility through a variety of dimensions and a range of contexts, there is a growing 
agreement that fragility is complex, multi-dimensional, and cannot be disassociated from 
local contexts.  
Fragile contexts have been described at all levels - national, regional, district, 
community, village, societal dynamics2, and interaction between units/groups. Fragile 
contexts can be detected in social preferences, social norms, shared mental models 
guiding individual decision-making. Fragility is multiscalar3, and occurs at various 
interlocking scales of resolution. The closer the analysis, the more detail is revealed, 
exposing a recursive fractal-like patterns of fragility4.  
Multi-scalar views can improve the understanding of how fragility determines 
dynamics and responses in specific situations, to internal and external stresses and 
shocks. Macro-shocks, like conflict, can change social interdependence and shared 
mental models and create traps for individuals and communities, with low trust and high 
prejudice5. On the other hand, individual decisions can affect macro-behavior patterns. 
Box 1. The World Bank measure of Country Fragility 
Attempts to measure fragility have been mostly focused on three broad set of 
properties: institutions and systems, economic dynamics and structural change, 
environment and societal relations, and their interplay6. The World Bank measure of 
State fragility focuses on the expert assessment of the status of institutions, systems and 
economic situations (as expressed in the CPIA ratings7), with the third dimension of 
societal relations, and the interplay of properties, included and explored in detail in 
country specific Social Analysis and in Fragility Assessments8. Analysis of environment 
factors has also been developed by the Bank as part of a framework to address the effect 
of climatic changes, and as part of the disaster risk management framework. Despite the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See Marc et al (2013) for a comprehensive review of societal dynamics and fragility.	  3	  Multiscalarity: property of a system that focuses on interlocking processes occurring at different 
scales. The concept was developed by Schiller (1978).	  4	  Fittingly, fractal geometry is used among others to understand turbulence in fluids.	  5	  World Development Report 2015.	  6	  Progress on the three dimensions has positive affects on reducing the likelihood of shocks, 
reducing the size of negative events, and reduce the overall harm. It also positively affects the role 
of covariate risks. 7	  The CPIA rating allow for measurement of change through comparative statics. 8	  See Mark et al 2013.	  
use of various tools for appraisal, there is no single World Bank framework for a multi-
disciplinary integrated assessment 9  of fragility as determined by the interplay of 
institutions and systems, economic dynamics and structural change, environment and 
climatic changes, societal dynamics and social cohesion. 
 
Box 2. The Drive to Broaden the Dimensions Representing the Status of Fragility 
The literature on fragility has explored a broad set of factors driving the 
development on long-term resilience, and proposed various sets of broad set of 
categorization. The initial focus on peace outcomes and state legitimacy has been 
constantly expanded to achieve a more comprehensive view of dimensions of resilience. 
Marc et al (2013) have developed the dimension of societal dynamics. In its forthcoming 
report, the OECD (2014) suggests the inclusion of two additional dimensions: resilience 
to economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters, and the economic 
fundamentals for sustainable development. As a further example of the effort of reaching 
exhaustiveness, the OECD is expanding the definition of peaceful societies to include 
micro-drivers such as organized crime, illicit flows and violence. 
III. Defining The Spatial Context of Fragility 
Fragility has been most commonly associated with nation-states, and most of the 
burgeoning literature of improving the status representation through fragility indicators 
adopts countries as their object of analysis. The spatial dimension of fragility however 
does not necessarily recoup with the boundaries of national statehood. Fragility can refer 
to territories within countries or across national boundaries. The disintegration of 
statehood into ethnic or sectarian entities often cuts across existing national borders (e.g. 
Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Mali). Some states are home of ‘ungoverned situations’10. Further, 
there are situations where man-made barriers have created spatial variations that are part 
of the stresses and systemic weaknesses that generate fragility. Isolation of territories 
(e.g. Gaza) or the creation of national boundaries that scatter ethnic minorities over a set 
of multiple nations are two examples of fragile situations that transcend the notion of 
fragility of the nation-state. At the same time, localized areas11 of fragility can exist 
within the boundaries of an otherwise high capacity country, as in slums or illicit trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  On the challenges to provide genuine multi-disciplinary assessments of local contexts, see Rao 
and Walton (2004).	  10	  E.g. Southern Somalia, Northeastern Yemen, Borno State in Nigeria, parts of Mauritania, 
Northern Mali, Cyreneica in Libia, the Waziristan in Pakistan	  11	  Some authors use ‘pockets of fragility’ – we prefer using terms such as ‘areas’ or ‘context’ as 
‘pockets’ mays suggests the idea of self-contained situations.	  	  
corridors in middle-income countries. For this reason, we use the term ‘fragile contexts’ 
in this note12. 
The use of ‘fragile situations/contexts’ instead of ‘fragile country’ is not semantic. 
Lack of data, indicators and analysis beyond the nation-state level may limit our 
understanding and leaving us with ‘blind spots’. 
The notion of fragile country presents important limitations even in countries with 
weak state capacity and legitimacy, as country-level focus of analysis may underestimate 
the importance of the urban-rural divide, ethnic differences, important socio-economic 
inequalities, and large and widening gaps in access and outcomes across the national 
territory. Such limitation is more important for countries that have not yet displayed any 
of the acute symptoms of fragility (self-identifying as fragile through episodes of 
violence or societal upheaval), where lack of understanding of situations may blind 
collective capacity to identify drivers of brewing crisis before crisis explode in the open.  
Finally, a transnational view can account for situations where fragility is 
determined by transnational (or transcontinental) factors, like illicit trade in drugs, people 
and arms. Both the analysis and response should be at a greater scale than the country, 
possibly at regional or global level. 
 
IV. Developing an Intersubjective Understanding of Stresses, Shocks and 
Vulnerabilities 
Early Views of Fragility as Risk 
In its earliest formulation, the conceptual model of fragility aimed at accounting 
for the observed risk of relapsing into conflict and violence, as half of African conflicts 
resumed within a decade after peace (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis, 2000). The model 
aimed at understanding risk factors underpinning the likelihood of relapsing into conflict, 
and included three broad dimensions of risks: grievances, ethnic dominance, inequalities 
and greed. The framework included a dynamic change of risk factors in post-crisis years: 
while grievances after conflict tend to fade relatively rapidly (the healing property of 
time), risks derived from management of ethnic dominance and economic inequalities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  ‘Contexts’ are defined as ‘wholes’, made of parts, but wholes nevertheless, and as States do, 
they include a spatial dimension, patterns of interactions, social and governance arrangements 
(Prosperi and Morgado 2011).	  
remain elevated for a longer time13. A parallel rich literature developed around the notion 
of weak national state institutions14. 
The WDR11 Framework 
The World Development Report 2011 on Fragility and Conflict offered an 
integrative framework, defining fragility as a dynamic and persistent condition resulting 
from the interplay of weak societal institutions confronted with internal and external 
stresses, and shocks.  The condition of fragility is both the result and the cause of internal 
and domestic pressures and shock. The multidimensionality of fragility reflects the 
multiple vulnerabilities, as well as the complex ripple effects of shocks. The “stresses” 
approach suggested in the WDR11, has the advantage of offering a framework that can 
both account for existing multi-dimensional and covariate stresses, and be expanded to 
include additional stresses as fragile countries undergo transformation, most significantly 
with demographic stresses, urbanization, the appearance of a youth bulge, climatic 
changes, and stronger integration in a globalized world. Marc et al (2013) have called for 
a broadening of the narrow focus on state institutions, and pointed out the role of social 
cohesion in significantly reducing fragility, as more cohesive societies are better able to 
manage internal and external stresses, reduce risks, and absorb shocks. 
An Intersubjective Meaning of fragility15  
In 2013, as part of the OECD-INCAF New Deal, the g7+ group of fragile states 
called on development partners to advance an operational definition of fragility that could 
overcome the stigma of an association of countries to fragility. They call to engage 
fragile countries as partners in assessing fragility, and in suggesting policies and reforms 
to increase resilience. Answering to this call requires the development of an 
intersubjective meaning of fragility, i.e. a common understanding of stresses, shocks, 
vulnerabilities, and resilience.  
As pointed out by Gauri, Woolcock and Desai (2011), in defining societal 
fragility it matters whether elites regard political exclusion as a result of insufficient 
inclusion, or as upholding a social norm. In addressing economic vulnerability to 
droughts, it matters whether land is perceived as a tradable capital good, or whether it is 
associated with individual and national identity. Lack of an intersubjective understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The operational consequence is that post-crisis recovery strategies need to evolve over time 
from short-term management of post-conflict risks, to longer-term management of inherited risks 
factors (legacies).	  14	  See Bertoli and Ticci (2010) for a comprehensive literature review.	  15	  By intersubjective meaning Gauri, Woolcock and Desai (2011) refer to the extent to which 
multiple relevant actors share a common subjective understanding of the nature of the problems 
they face, and the possible solutions to those problems.	  
is central in driving public action failures, and explaining predominant modalities of 
response to shocks and opportunities in different local contexts16. 
The WDR14 contribution 
The World Development Report 2014 on Risk provides a complementary 
framework for understanding the risk chain, and its ex-post and ex-ante impact, giving an 
insight into the “black box” of effects of stresses and shocks on outcomes. In the 
following (simplified, one dimensional) risk chain, the elements of fragility have been 
highlighted. Fragility can both stem from localized weaknesses, or from overall system 
breakdowns.  
The factors determining the response to stresses and shocks can stem from state 
institutions and governance systems, societal dynamics, socio-economic structure, and 
their interplay. As an example, a resilient response to rising food prices will depend on 
the quality of response across the state/society/economy continuum. In a worst case 
scenario, the combination of a weakened economy, an inefficient state and fractured 
societal relations could lead to violence, or even push a society over the edge into open 
conflict. 
 
 
Risk Chain. Adapted from World Development Report 2014, Petersh (2013). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Societal divisions may hamper the development of a intersubjective understanding of 
fragility. Parts of the society might identify very different drivers of fragility than other 
parts. To account for this divergence of interests, fostering a sense of national dialogue 
around a common understanding of problems is necessary.	  
The descriptive tool of ‘risk chains’ is not intended as device for subtracting 
layers of complexity from contexts. Quiet the contrary. We suggest the risk chain is a 
useful device for framing the multi-dimensionality of the fragility context, corresponding 
to different policy responses, even within the limited scope of a single dimensional 
stress/shock. It helps provide a different framework for understanding capability traps, 
and suggest highly context specific diagnostics drivers of fragility/resilience. It may 
provide a useful diagnostic framework for application of operational approaches such as 
PDIA (Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation) suggested by Desai, Pritchett and 
Woolcock. 
V. Integrating Extreme Events, Hidden Exposures and Tail Risks 
The fragility literature has devoted little attention to risk of events with extreme 
consequences. This has led to an under-identification problem (type II error)17. The 
magnitude of the under-identification may be significant: in recent years shocks have 
played an important role in reversing progress in fragile contexts, and revealing (hidden) 
fragility in higher capability situations, such as in the Arab World. 
The recent spurt of literature on tail risk in the financial sector in the wake of the 
2007 financial crisis can provide a useful organizing framework for expanding the 
understanding of fragile contexts (see Taleb et al 2012). Its relevance is especially strong 
for understanding hidden exposures and tail risks, which are concept that had been 
neglected for long in the banking sector literature, and continue to be neglected in the 
country fragility literature. 
In the wake of the internal and external stresses highlighted in the WDR 2011 
framework, a negative outcome is essentially determined by three variables: the event 
size, its likelihood, and the size and dynamic of the resulting harm. The illustration below 
is drawn from the framework suggested in Taleb et al 2012. In case of concave pay-off 
structures, the harm of the tail event escalates exponentially. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Hidden exposures may lead to fragility self-identifying itself in the form of open crisis.	  
On the other hand, states that do not display crisis are less likely to be considered fragile 
(creating a selection bias, Bardhan  in DEC Lecture 2014).	   A too close identification 
through outcomes, and the risk of type II errors, fuel the criticism of fragility being 
tautological.	  
  
 
Accordingly, high levels of fragility and exposure to risk can be determined either 
by a) high likelihood, or b) size of the event, or c) high level of impact. Negative 
convexity effects can also be present when complexity results in (d) positive feedbacks. 
This can be described by fragility functions, similar to functions employed in the 
earthquake literature. 
The recent Ebola outbreak has pointed to lingering fragility in countries such as 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, which had outgrown fragility to conflict, while massive 
displacement has increased the perception of fragility in Lebanon. At the same, recent 
extreme events in attention in higher capacity countries (Ukraine, Egypt, Syria, Nigeria, 
among others) point to the limits of not systematically assessing fragility dynamics in 
countries outside the low-income group. 
Fragility in low income/low capacity countries may appear different than fragility 
in medium income/higher capacity countries as in the latter concavity of tail events may 
be more predominant, while in the former fragility may appear in the form of substantial 
likelihood of events that present a linear negative pay-off curve. We are not however 
suggesting a clear-cut distinction between low capacity and high capacity context – 
concavity effects may be present in lower capacity countries as well. This is what the 
nascent literature on conflict and effects of climatic changes seems to be pointing to (see 
Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013). 
 
 
VI. Long-term resilience and transformation 
In the long-run, resilience is the outcome of three broad, complex, multi-scalar, 
covariate and inter-twined dimensions of development such as peaceful and inclusive 
societies, effective institutions and management systems (including the natural 
environment), supported by a process of socio-economic transformation (sustained shared 
growth of livelihoods). 
In the short-run, there is no single blueprint for progressing toward strengthening 
resilience. Dercon (2007) distinguishes between a) preventive strategies (alter the risk 
profile), b) mitigation strategies (alter the outcome experience), c) coping strategies 
(relieve the impact of shocks). Resilience to shocks and stresses is determined by both the 
strength of individual element and the resilience of the overall context. Resilience can be 
improved by either addressing single vulnerabilities (e.g. droughts) and reducing stresses, 
develop stabilizers (e.g. insurance), or strengthening the overall institutional structure. 
The institutional structure can be improved either through systemic redesign, or by 
targeted evolutionary improvements that increase the overall resilience. A coordinated 
systematic approach across actors is more likely to provide results, avoiding an 
uncoordinated discrete set of interventions.  
Evaluation of resilience requires a cross-scalar approach. Traditional development 
policies hinge on the assumption that transformation can be understood as a process of 
continuous improvement, and that continuous improvements reduce vulnerability and 
fragility. However, per definition, change does not imply stability, and hence 
transformative policies may lead to change the overall structure of stresses and 
vulnerability, without achieving an overall resilience. As an example, centralization may 
increase the national state’s capacity, however it may increase vulnerability of local 
governments. This idea echoes the g7+ group definition of fragility as a “period of time 
during nationhood”, pointing to the inherent instability that comes with national socio-
economic transformation. A cross-scalar understanding of overall resilience can allow to 
better point out stresses and trade-offs inherent to transformational policies. 
There is little realism in expecting linear progress. Andrews, Pritchet and 
Woolcock (2012) identify possible damaging strategic behaviors in response to external 
expectations. The authors point to the risk of transformation leading to ‘isomorphic 
mimicry’, with overall capability of state stagnating or even decreasing, creating 
‘capability traps’. They suggest a problem-driven iterative approach to reform focused on 
problem solving, leaving room for local context experimentation, and close feedback 
loops. 
Conclusion 
This note is an attempt to suggest a few basic elements for a conceptual model of 
fragility as a dynamic process, that could help conceptualize and operationalize fragility 
in a way that is useful to policymakers and practitioners when designing development 
strategies, and allocating funds. We’ve pointed out the need to overcome income-level 
related definitions of fragility inherited from the LICUS framework, the important 
limitation of national boundaries as main unit of analysis, and the relevance of the risk 
framework suggested by the WDR14 to complement the WDR11 framework. Further, 
we’ve suggested embracing a multiscalar view of fragility, pointing to a possible way of 
integrating the framework of the upcoming WDR15 on Mind and Development.  
The ground covered in this note is not exhaustive. We reckon the simplicity of the 
conceptual model can allow for easy integration of individual dimensions, including the 
nascent literature of the effects of climatic change on human conflict. 
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